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Abstract
Background: This paper combines the literature on public health, on economics of health and on
economics of technological innovation to discuss the peculiarities of labour in the health care
sector.
Method and framework: The starting point is the investigation of the economic peculiarities of
medical care.
Results and discussions: This investigation leads to the identification of the prevalence of non-
market forms of medical care in the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). Furthermore, the health care system has a distinctive characteristic from
other economic sectors: it is the intersection between social welfare and innovation systems. The
relationship between technological innovation and cost in the health care sector is surveyed. Finally,
the Brazilian case is discussed as an example of a developing country.
Conclusion: The peculiarities of labour in the health care sector suggest the need to recognize
the worth of sectoral labour and to cease to treat it separately. This process should take into
account the rapid development of the health innovation system and one important consequence:
the obsolescence of the acquired knowledge. One way to dignify labour is to implement continued
education and training of health professions personnel.
Background
Labour in the health care sector has specific characteristics
that are evidenced by its institutional organization. The
special economic properties of medical care determine the
generalized emergence of what is called "market failures"
in the economic literature. That is, the operation of mar-
ket forces alone is not sufficient for the working of this
sector, as is recognized in a recent report of the World
Bank [1]. Society constructs varied institutional forms in
order to offset market flaws by assigning an essential role
to non-market institutions to render adequate services.
The welfare state institutions may be viewed as an expres-
sion of social attempts to offset generalized market fail-
ures in the health care sector.
The next section of this paper presents the method of
investigating the economic peculiarities of medical care as
the starting point of this paper. The economic literature
extensively discusses this subject, and the theoretical basis
for social welfare institutions is well-grounded. This
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literature shows how superficial and theoretically poor are
those approaches that wholly or predominantly insist on
the market role for the operation of the health care sector.
Kenneth Arrow's (Nobel economics prize, 1972) seminal
contribution is a powerful remedy for such superficiality.
Arrow's analysis [2] is a conducting line for this paper.
Arrow highlights that "the special economic problems of
medical care can be explained as adaptations to the exist-
ence of uncertainty in the incidence of disease and in the
efficacy of treatment". The weight of uncertainty and
expressive information asymmetries determine the emer-
gence of market failures, and hence the need of institu-
tions to deal with such activities.
Based on these theoretical topics, the results of this
approach are presented in the third section, which points
to the prevalence of non-market forms of medical care
organizations – an empirical confirmation of Arrow's
analysis according to Barr [3]. Another specificity of
labour in this sector is derived from this topic: the way
these services are articulated (existing institutions, regula-
tion and competition pressure) may affect both the qual-
ity of medical care and the pace of scientific research (and
future scientific-technological progress as well).
The fourth section discusses a very distinctive characteris-
tic of health care: its location in the intersection of two
constituting institutional arrangements in advanced capi-
talist societies – the social welfare system is connected to
the national innovation system. In other words, the pro-
fessionals' performance in the sector affects – and is
strongly affected by – the pace of scientific advancement
and technological innovations. To simplify, one could say
that a hospital is part of both systems [4].
In the fifth section, an assessment of this articulation
between both systems introduces a discussion on cost
peculiarities and those of technological progress in the
health care sector.
The sixth section discusses the specific characteristics of
the Brazilian situation. The precarious and rudimentary
character of the social welfare institutions, the serious
problems of access to health services and the general
determinants of health conditions in Brazil, in addition to
the incipient Brazilian innovation system (including that
in health matters), simply add new problems to Arrow's
list. Problems of resource allocation are crucial for defin-
ing the profile of the systems being settled, which
amounts to one more labour peculiarity in the sector: that
is, the involvement of professionals in the area in defining
such a profile is not a trivial issue.
By articulating all questions so far developed, the seventh
section concludes the paper by assessing the crucial role of
recognizing the worth of labour in the health care sector
and of ending its isolation.
Method and framework
The starting point of this paper is the analysis of the eco-
nomic peculiarities of medical care. Medical practice is
full of lessons on the special character of medical care.
Any physician or health care manager is able to describe a
set of properties distinguishing the activity of a health pro-
fessional from those of other workers in more conven-
tional activities.
Perhaps one of the most often perceived differences in the
sector is the lack of consumers' ability to choose their own
basket of goods and services due to their lack of informa-
tion for decision-making. It is useless to ask a patient
whether he/she would prefer chemotherapy instead of
radiotherapy in case he/she is able to afford only one of
the alternatives. By the same token, it would also be use-
less to ask the patient whether he/she prefers an immuno-
logical examination or a magnetic resonance scan.
Such a situation is aggravated because the decision must
be made at a time of personal or family distress – an ill-
ness threatens to take the patient's life or that of a loved
one. For this reason, in contrast to other items whose con-
sumption can be postponed, the consumer will make a
heroic effort and will certainly not hesitate to try all avail-
able alternatives. This breaks one of the basic rules for ade-
quate market resource allocation, as there is no symmetry
of information. One side – the service provider – suppos-
edly holds the information by accumulating esoteric
knowledge [5] that is inaccessible to the other side.
Another important difference resides in the existence of
limits to "rationalizing the production" as in other eco-
nomic sectors. Every emergency service must always have
a neurosurgeon available, even if traumas requiring noc-
turnal procedures rarely occur. It would be inadmissible
to deny treatment to a person with multiple traumas on
the basis of statistical evidence that his or her condition
accounts for a small incidence of traumas and that it
would not be economically justified to keep staff for this
purpose. As a further example, even though snakebite is
becoming increasingly rare, every health care unit must
keep antivenin in stock – duly cooled and periodically
checked – most of which is discarded.
Possible functions of standardized production are one
more example of major differences. In industry, such pos-
sibilities stem from a relative standardization and monot-
onous industrial processes – the inputs are constant, the
processes are repetitive and the outcome is alwaysHuman Resources for Health 2005, 3:8 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/8
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expected and predicted. In the health sector things are not
as simple, as inputs and processes cannot be fully
standardized.
An extensive literature shows that distinct health agents or
even distinct medical "cultures" come to entirely different
diagnoses regarding similar groups of patients submitted
to them and prescribe utterly different therapies. Accord-
ing to the patient's social, economic and cultural level, the
same disease may be given a totally different treatment. A
verminosis, for example, may be treated with broad-spec-
trum drugs instead of a simple faeces examination or it
could be treated using a series of examinations that could
lead to a similar therapy (broad-spectrum drugs).
All this happens because there is much subjectivity in the
health labour process, which remains basically artisanal,
grounded on sight, touch and smell instead of being read-
ily captured in a defined algorithm. Although a great deal
of information may be objective – blood pressure, coro-
nary permeability, electrocardiographic waves – other
data or even the interpretation of those considered objec-
tive are quite subjective. There is always a feeling, a clinical
look, based on subjective hints, that may trigger a dozen
supplementary examinations. In addition, there is a sort
of association between the physician and the patient that
has been ontologically constructed during human history,
ever since someone's sufferings were first alleviated by
someone else.
Hindrances to standardization, however, should be qual-
ified. In some health areas, there are – within certain lim-
its – standard procedures, such as: laboratory procedures;
highly standardized procedures in hospital sectors, result-
ing in serial surgeries; in public health, a number of
advancements were achieved by means of standard proto-
cols (e.g. for the treatment of diarrhoea and acute respira-
tory infections); medical procedures can be partially
standardized through detailed classification (as for exam-
ple, the Diagnosis Related Groups – DRGs).
Such elements, however, encounter a significant limit –
the clinical contact controls all other procedures. And the
clinical contact is based on much more shifting variables
in which there are imponderables and from which it is dif-
ficult to construct closed algorithms.
Such observations constitute a source of empirical ele-
ments for a substantive theoretical elaboration of the
peculiar characteristics of medical care as an economic
category. Such peculiarities thus present a series of limita-
tions to the market's ability to provide such services in a
quantitatively and qualitatively adequate manner. Arrow
had the merit to present this discussion based on an elab-
orate economic conception.
Arrow's paper [2] is pedagogically structured. Firstly, the
market's working is described in accordance with the neo-
classical economic theory that it should lead to the occur-
rence of a competitive equilibrium and optimum status.
Then, the author poses hindrances to medical care mar-
ketability. The first basic difference from common com-
modities is related to the risk-bearing associated with
medical care – "to a great extent a disease is an unpredict-
able phenomenon". A subtle outcome arises: "When there
is uncertainty, information or knowledge becomes a com-
modity ..." But information, in the form of skilled care, is
precisely what is being bought from most physicians and,
indeed, from most professionals.
The elusive character of information as a commodity sug-
gests that it departs considerably from the usual marketa-
bility assumptions about commodities." (p. 183). Thus,
he sustains that "all the special features of this industry, in
fact, stem from the prevalence of uncertainty". Finally,
Arrow considers that "when the market fails to achieve an
optimum state, society will, to some extent at least, recog-
nize the gap, and non-market social institutions will arise
attempting to bridge it" (p. 184). Therefore, such unique
characteristics call for "a special place for medical care in
economic analysis" (p. 186).
First, the demand for it is irregular and unpredictable
(contrary to the demand for food and clothing, for exam-
ple). Another important aspect is that the demand for
health care is usually associated with an assault on per-
sonal integrity. A disease is not just a risk, but a risk asso-
ciated with a cost per se (reduction or loss of labour
capacity, even temporary, obviously affecting one's earn-
ing capacity), which is distinct from the specific cost of
medical care (p. 187). Furthermore, there is an "opportu-
nity cost": the time lost for earning in the labour market
while undergoing treatment.
Second, the physician's behavior cannot be fully known
in advance – medical care is one of the activities of which
"the product and the activity are identical". In these cases,
the commodity purchased cannot be tested before con-
suming and "there is an element of trust in the relation".
The physician's behavior "is assumed to be ruled with
concern to the patient's welfare, which is not expected
from a salesperson". "In Talcott Parsons's terms, there is a
'collectivity-orientation', which distinguishes medicine
and other professions from business, where self-interest
on the part of participants is the accepted norm" (p. 187).
Other typical differences from business people would be
that: advertisement and price competition are virtually
absent among physicians; counseling by doctors concern-
ing other treatment is supposedly given without self-inter-
est; and treatment should be oriented by the needs of theHuman Resources for Health 2005, 3:8 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/8
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specific case and not restrained by financial considera-
tions (p. 187). Finally, resource allocation in this area is
significantly affected by "ethic compulsion" (p. 188).
Third, there is uncertainty concerning the output – recov-
ery from a disease is as unpredictable as its incidence:
"Because medical knowledge is so complicated, the infor-
mation possessed by the physician as to the consequences
and possibilities of treatment is necessarily very much
greater than that of the patient, or at least so it is believed
by both parts. Further, both parts are aware of this infor-
mational inequality, and their relation is colored by this
knowledge" (p. 190). Information asymmetry proves to
have a crucial weight in the physician-patient
relationship.
A relevant aspect should be added here: although the phy-
sician knows better than the patient, his/her knowledge is
still extremely limited, given the extensive ignorance areas
of scientific knowledge concerning the working of a
human body, aetiology of a number of diseases, etc. Thus,
there is a great difference between purchasing a chair from
a cabinetmaker and a medical appointment – the cabinet-
maker knows how to make the chair that the client
desires, but the doctor has every chance of knowing very
little about how to treat the patient or even being unable
to do so.
Fourth, supply conditions are uncertain – entry into the
market is not free, which restrains the assumption of full
mobility of the production factors. Doctors must be
licensed to provide medical services. Furthermore, medi-
cal education costs are high and apparently are only par-
tially incurred by the student (p. 191), which means
another dissociation from the requirements for the work-
ing of competitive markets, i.e. private benefits granted to
students after graduation exceed private costs. Arrow asso-
ciates the high costs of medical education with the quality
requirements imposed by the American Medical Associa-
tion (AMA) since the Flexner Report (p. 191–192) became
known.
Fifth, pricing is uncertain – this topic is not usual in eco-
nomic texts. There is an extensive price discrimination
according to the patient's income, at one extreme reaching
zero cost for indigent patients. Price competition is
strongly disapproved.
Sixth, there exist indivisibilities – specialists and some sort
of equipment constitute significant indivisibilities (p.
194).
As risk (of the disease and its treatment outcome) deter-
mines the medical care "market", Arrow calls for the pos-
sibility of an insurance market that might be able to
organize and distribute such risks. If such a market were
possible, the problems identified so far could be solved.
However, the analysis of a hypothetical ideal insurance
market (pp. 199–207) points to a set of problems:
• uncovered population segments (unemployed popula-
tion, aged people, chronic disease sufferers, low-income
population);
• differentiated risk pooling (if the market is competitive,
high-risk individuals will tend to have to pay higher
premiums);
• existence of moral hazard, to the extent that individuals
covered by the insurance plans would tend to overuse
them;
• adverse selection – an aspect pointed out by Akerlof [6],
since in case premiums increased so as to cover elderly
people, individuals bearing higher risks would be pre-
cisely those who would tend to agree to pay for the insur-
ance (therefore, the individuals selected by the insurer
would be exactly those with greater health problems: the
costlier individuals for the system);
• uninsurable diseases (e.g. AIDS at the epidemic outset);
• existence of interdependent probabilities (when a prob-
lem affecting a person reaches other people, as in epidem-
ics) [3];
• high administrative costs (which would serve as an argu-
ment in favor of quite generalized plans, particularly the
compulsory ones).
Such problems determine the market's incapacity to pro-
vide a comprehensive insurance for medical care (p. 210).
In a recent interview, Arrow [7] maintained the diagnosis
of the 1963 paper, suggesting that funding the system
through contributions to a centralized system "can be
accomplished in a cheaper way than having many com-
petitive insurance plans". An interesting aspect of this
interview is that it confirms the basic elements of a diag-
nosis accomplished more than 20 years ago.
In the postscript to his original paper [2], Arrow highlights
two aspects as follows: the failure of the market in devel-
oping policies of insurance against uncertainty has stimu-
lated the emergence of many social institutions; in these
institutions, the usual market premises are "contradicted
to a certain extent". He notes that this is not an exclusive
problem of the medical profession. All through the text,
he emphasizes the role of nonprofit institutions in the sec-
tor (e.g. p. 191).Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:8 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/8
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Results: the prevalence of non-market forms of 
medical care in the OECD countries
Barr [3], in his evaluation of the social welfare states,
points out that the structures of medical care organiza-
tions are internationally more divergent than those pro-
viding benefits, the other major function of the welfare
state. According to Barr, there are various arrangements
that can be grouped into three categories:
• a quasi-actuarial approach (purchase of private insur-
ance by individuals and employees as well as private own-
ership of "medical factors of production" – as found in the
United States);
• social security related to earnings (compulsory and
funded by employees and/or employers' contributions
sometimes supplemented by taxes, services rendered by a
big private sector – Canada – or by a small private sector
– Germany); universal medical services (funded by taxes
and publicly owned and/or controlled factors of produc-
tion – New Zealand, Sweden and United Kingdom);
• social service (most countries adopt schemes of this
kind).
Another way of evaluating the distinct characteristics of
medical care systems is accomplished by the OECD [8]. Its
characterization does not contradict that explained by
Barr (1992). In a different approach, Esping-Anderson [9]
points to three categories of welfare systems: the Nordic,
that of continental Europe and the Anglo-Saxon. This
agenda contributes to a comparison between Arrow's
diagnosis and the reality.
A general scenario can be drawn based on data from the
World Bank Report [1], which show the relative weight of
government expenditure in capitalist developed coun-
tries: 60% of total expenditure, according to the 1990
data. Even in the United States, where the private sector
shows the highest participation among advanced coun-
tries, government health expenditure reached 6.17% of
GDP in 2001, which amounted to 44.6% of total health
expenditure (Table 1).
According to Barr's scheme, the American health system is
one of those that is closer to the private market model:
this system "shows those problems predicted in the the-
ory". In terms of resource allocation, public expenditure
covers exactly those areas in which policies designed for
health insurance are not capable of paying for the risks:
Medicare for aged people; Medicaid for the poor; military
veterans (partially due to chronic health problems);
maternity and children's welfare. Furthermore, an increas-
ingly high cost and unequal access to services can also be
found: at the end of the 1980s, 17.5% of the population
above 65 years of age could not count on adequate insur-
ance coverage in the United States [3]. Finally, based on
an assessment of the most pro-market health care system,
Arrow's view – outlined in his classical paper – is
confirmed.
It is worth noting that the pattern of the American public
expenditure on health is comparable to those in countries
found at the other extreme of a description of welfare sys-
tems proposed by Barr: the Swedish government invests
6.8% of the country's total GDP in health (Table 1).
The issue concerning the effectiveness of the several insti-
tutional arrangements is very controversial. Hurst [10]
compares the systems in the United States, Canada and
the United Kingdom, concluding that the British system
would be the most efficient, as it was the cheapest, with
similar results.
An international comparison raises relevant questions on
the relative effectiveness of health care systems. The World
Table 1: Total health care expenditure, relative participation of private sector and public sector health expenditure
Country Total expenditure 
(% of GDP)
Private expenditure 
(% of total)
Public expenditure 
(% of GDP)
United States 13.9 55.6 6.17
Canada 9.5 29.2 6.73
Sweden 8.7 14.8 7.41
United Kingdom 7.6 17.8 6.25
Germany 10.8 25.1 8.09
France 9.6 24.0 7.29
The Netherlands 8.9 36.7 5.63
Average: countries with high HDI 9.8 29.0 6.79
Brazil 7.6 58.4 3.16
Source: WHO (2001)Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:8 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/8
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Bank report, for example, compares countries in terms of
health expenditure and results [1]. According to this eval-
uation, the United States is at one extreme, i.e. the coun-
tries with the worst performance and highest expenditure.
China is placed at the opposite extreme – better perform-
ance with lower expenditure (Figure 3.1, p. 54).
Such evaluation is not a trivial task. Measuring productiv-
ity is (usually) an old problem in economics and it is
becoming even more serious with the emergence of infor-
mation and communication technologies [11]. Measuring
productivity in the service sector (where the health care
sector is placed) is even more troublesome. Gordon [12]
presents a general survey of the discussion for the United
States. In assessing the growth rates of sectoral products by
employee, he found that the health care services presented
a positive variation rate only during the period 1960–
1972. In the remaining periods (1972–1979, 1979–1987,
1987–1992), it was negative. According to Griliches [11],
these services would be ranked among those hard-to-
measure sectors (as opposed to measurable economic
activities).
Although measuring productivity in the sector is trouble-
some and controversial, measuring cost increases is not;
the difficulty here is to determine the reasons for the rise
in medical care costs. What is consensual in the literature
is the role that the structure of incentives plays in the cost
dynamics and even in the direction technological progress
will take in the sector [13]. In other words, the way medi-
cal care is organized (in the various existing structures)
contributes to the definition of the activity performance
and the expenditure policy.
In order to understand the effect of medical care organiza-
tion on its performance, a study developed in Brazil is
quite instructive. Campos [14] found that the physician's
decision – considering all the degrees of liberty that pro-
fessional autonomy grants him/her – strongly affects the
consumption pattern and the impact of medical action on
the epidemiological indicators. By studying the resolvabil-
ity of health care services in homogeneous cities – whose
differences are only those relative to the health profes-
sionals' labour ties – the author found a significant differ-
ence between a system hiring its professionals under a
regime of labor exclusiveness as compared to a traditional
system of multiple labour ties. An explanation for this
would be that the first model forces an on-the-spot reso-
lution of problems, since the lack of resolution of a prob-
lem implies the patient's return, sometimes with some
inconvenience regarding time and circumstances to the
professional.
The second model, by its segmentation, is limited to the
traditional treatment prescription without taking account
of the outcome of such a behavior, as a responsibility tie
is not established between the professional and the
patient. Campos [14] concludes that "working in an
exclusiveness regime is the major determinant of such a
differential behavior". In all dichotomies found in a tree
of decisions studied – e.g. concerning the commitment to
a drug prescription, laboratory examinations prescribed
and hospitalizations, among others – significant differ-
ences in behaviour were found among medical personnel.
The outcome of this investigation can be generalized in
terms of determining the way labour is organized consid-
ering the quality of its results. With regard to the United
States, it is believed that the structure of medical insurance
through third-party payments and fee-for-service encour-
ages the overuse of services (leading to increasing prices).
Barr [3] considers this structure to be one of the causes of
high costs in the American system. The emergence of
health maintenance organizations – HMOs – has been an
alternative of shared responsibilities by the users and serv-
ice providers, a way by which the agents share the conse-
quences of increased expenses (cutting harmful incentives
granted to third-party payments). The growth of HMOs is
also related to encouragement of competition among
service providers, a policy suggested by the World Bank to
high-income countries [1].
Such changes affect academic research, however. Studies
show that "in regions where managed care plans are dom-
inant and where there is stiff competition for dollars and
patients among hospitals, physicians at academic medical
centers report more pressure to take care of patients – and
thus conduct fewer human studies, do less clinical
research, and publish fewer papers" (NSF) [15]. A prob-
lematic result of higher competition at the service level is
that nowadays medical research is directly related to the
future quality of medical care.
Discussion: the health care sector's articulation 
of two institutional arrangements – social 
welfare systems and national innovation systems
The health care system possesses a distinctive characteris-
tic relative to other economic sectors, i.e. it is the intersec-
tion between social welfare and innovation systems.
These two systems (two institutional constructions)
endeavour to surmount market restrictions. Arrow [16]
points to a market economy trend to under-invest in
research and development activities, which, as in the med-
ical sector, would lead to the emergence of non-profit
institutions so as to reach more desirable levels of R&D
investment. These two institutional arrangements may be
justified by Arrow's analysis [17], which considers that the
market poses restrictions to efficiency (a task for the inno-
vation systems) and equity (a task for social welfare
systems).Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:8 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/8
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The scientific and technological progress of nations – a
decisive source of economic growth and development – is
an outcome of complex institutional articulations involv-
ing firms, their R&D laboratories, universities and
research institutions, financial systems, teaching institu-
tions in general and the interaction of all such institu-
tions, especially among firms [18,19].
The development of innovation systems is derived from a
trend predicted by Marx [20], i.e. the systematic applica-
tion of science to production. National systems of innova-
tion may be studied as an institutionalization of this
phenomenon discussed in the Grundrisse.
A national innovation system can be disaggregated into
different sectors as the characteristics of technological
progress vary significantly among the several sectors
[21,22]. It is appropriate to say that innovation in the tex-
tile sector is quite different from innovation in the com-
puter industry, i.e. the latter, for instance, depends much
more on scientific knowledge and has a closer relation to
universities and research outcomes [23]. Scholars of inno-
vation economics have been surprised at the existence of
a close relation between science and technology in the
health care sector [24]. Following this rationale, the
health sector can be outlined by the innovative dynamics
differently from other economic sectors. Cautiously, how-
ever, the existence of an innovative subsector in the health
care sector could be suggested.
A starting point already determined in the specific litera-
ture of the sector [25] is the notion of medical-industrial
complex, which is an articulation involving medical care,
education networks (schools, universities), the pharma-
ceutical industry and the medical equipment and diagnos-
tic instrument industry. Back to that suggested
formulation, the existence of an innovative subsystem
within the health sector stemming from the literature on
economics of technology and innovation adds to it a
major aspect, i.e. it is necessary to study the information
flows of technology and the mechanisms generating inno-
vation in the medical-industrial complex. Gelijns &
Rosenberg [26] presented a review of the literature on
complex interactions between universities, industries and
medical care systems, which pushed forward the advance-
ment of medical technology. As in other sectors, interac-
tions between demand for and supply of innovation are
complex and varied.
On the one side, the study of a sectoral system necessarily
contributes to the understanding of the medical care sys-
tem. That is, the quantity and quality of treatment sup-
plied, diagnostic methods and available equipment
constitute a direct result of investment accomplished in
scientific and technological research. By the way – and this
is an important aspect for the specific objectives of this
paper – a good deal of the "guilt" over the increased cost
of the health care sector has been laid on technological
innovation [3].
Lessons from the literature on economics of technology
broke the traditional vision of technological progress,
known as a "linear model". According to this model, there
would be a process "from the top down", starting with
basic research towards the laboratories of firms where
applied research is accomplished and finally reaching the
production phase. It could roughly be depicted in a
scheme as follows: SCIENCE → TECHNOLOGY →
PRODUCTION
This linear scheme is considered a distant representation
of reality. Sources of technical progress are much more
complex. For example, solving problems and bottlenecks
in production is a major source of innovation (this is the
way new methods of production appear). In many
instances, the arrows' sense is the opposite – radio astron-
omy has been developed as a new scientific discipline
based on the work of two physicists (Penzias and Wilson),
employees at the laboratories of the Bell Company, in an
attempt to solve a noise problem in transcontinental tele-
phone calls. Therefore, science can be viewed as both lead-
ing and following technological advances [19]. For this
reason, the existence of a dynamic nucleus of firms is cru-
cial for the maturing of national innovation systems.
Hospitals play a major role as an authentic reservoir of
innovation "coming from the top". Hospitals contribute
to scientific development, i.e. the arrows of the scheme
above point to both sides in the health sector, too. As a
matter of fact, service-providing would usually play a sim-
ilar role to that of firms in other sectoral systems: solving
problems and escaping from bottlenecks is a significant
source of innovation [4].
What is peculiar in the interaction between health innova-
tion systems and health care systems is their closer tie to
each other and the more immediate impact between tech-
nological progress and social welfare, the latter a decisive
component of economic growth sources. Therefore, inno-
vation in the health sector would have a double effect on
the economic dynamics in general – the "usual" effects of
every innovation and also those on health and welfare.
The relevance of such an articulation simply adds a new
peculiarity and a new source of labour heterogeneity to
the sector. It would not be possible to grasp the health
care system integrally by neglecting academic research in
the life sciences. The life sciences spent 54.4% (USD 10.83
billion) of total resources for R&D in academic institu-
tions in 1993. In that year, the total United StatesHuman Resources for Health 2005, 3:8 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/8
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expenditure on R&D amounted to USD 134.4 billion
[27]. In 1994, the health sector absorbed 16.5% of federal
expenditure on R&D, which reached USD 68.33 billion.
The weight of R&D investment in health can also be
assessed in the industrial sector. Drugs and medicines
were the industrial sector with the most intense R&D
(R&D expenditure in relation to revenues), and the sector
of optical and surgical instruments and others was placed
fifth [27]. Total expenditure on biomedical R&D funding
reached USD 30 billion in 1993 [28]. Industry accounted
for 50% of the total. American industry increasingly
depends on the funding of science with public resources;
the leading position of the biomedical sector is high-
lighted in this regard [29].
Therefore, it is possible to trace a labour repositioning, in
relation to which the pole constituted by activities con-
nected with intellectual labour can be found [30]. The
peculiarity of labour repositioning in the health care sec-
tor would not reside in the shift of functions of manual
labour (as in the industrial sector), but in the increased
participation of more skilled professionals (including sci-
entists and researchers), in addition to the demand for
better-trained professionals in the area to deal with diag-
nostic methods and electronic equipment, etc. Such a
dynamic stresses the need for training and retraining the
whole set of professionals in the sector: the speed of tech-
nological progress enhances the role of continued
learning.
Discussion: technological innovation and cost in 
the health care sector
The technological innovation dynamics in health care has
been considered one of the reasons for the increased
expenses in the sector. This would be partly explained by
another peculiarity in the sector, i.e. the cumulative intro-
duction of technology, as opposed to other production
sectors, where new technology replaces the old. For exam-
ple, the introduction of cardiac imaging (electrocardio-
gram, echocardiography, Doppler) did not replace
traditional auscultation; the old technology and the new
are used interchangeably. The obstetrician works with the
time-tested Pinnard stethoscope together with modern
sonar devices in order to listen to the fetal heartbeat.
In the case of the United States, there is another question
derived from the pressure the demand for medical care
exerts on R&D activities: the health insurance mode of
organization based on retrospective payments (the mode
of medical care and the incentive structure hence derived)
exerts pressure on R&D activities in terms of producing
costly and effort-consuming innovation [13]. Recent
changes in the system would lead to a reversal of this pres-
sure so as not to encourage the use of expensive technolo-
gies. As an example, General Electric had frozen the
development of a diagnostic technology called positron
emission tomography (PET) which "produces tridimen-
sional images reflecting chemical and metabolic activities
in the tissues". The reason for such a freeze, according to
the company, was that government was too stringent in
approving reimbursement to patients for PET scans. Previ-
ously, the company had invested heavily in developing
computerized tomography scanners (CT) and magnetic
resonance imaging (MCI), and had taken them to the
market [13].
Such sensitivity in terms of technological progress in rela-
tion to the incentive structure is quite important. Two
examples of how the structure of service provision affects
both its quality [14] and the degree of involvement of hos-
pital units with research [15] were presented in the third
section. Surveying this subject, Halm & Gelijns [31] say:
"it is clear that the critical point here is not medical tech-
nology per se, but a combination of economic, profes-
sional, and social incentives in the health care system
which tend to diminish apprehensions as to the decision-
making in medical care".
There is evidence that technological innovations are not
exclusively price-raising in medical care [13]. This is an
open question in the OECD document, which is uncertain
"whether new technologies are part of the problem, part
of the solution or both" [32].
In order to analyse this aspect, Weisbrod compares vac-
cines and transplants, their costs, effects and respective
demands for innovation. He used the biologist Lewis Tho-
mas' elaboration, which distinguishes three technological
development stages in medicine so as to make his posi-
tion explicit:
• at the lowest level, the non-technology level, where the
relation between the patient and the disease is entirely
understood. Little can be done by the patient, hospitaliza-
tion and infirmary services, and there is little hope of
recovery (untreatable cancer, severe rheumatoid arthritis,
multiple sclerosis, advanced cirrhosis);
• at a somewhat higher level, halfway technologies, which
would include dealing with the disease and its disabling
effects. These are technologies that adjust the patient to
his/her disease and postpone death (artificial organ
implants, cancer treatment by means of surgery, radiation
and chemotherapy);
• high technologies, as for example immunization, antibi-
otics and prevention of nutritional disorders, are designed
for diseases whose mechanisms are known and whose
treatment/prevention is feasible.Human Resources for Health 2005, 3:8 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/8
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Weisbrod suggests the use of the following dynamic
scheme: historically, knowledge goes from the first kind of
technology to the second and then to the third. From this
scheme, it arises that the cost function associated with
such a dynamic process is an inverted U-shaped one. In
the case of non-technology, not much can be done and
the costs are low. The most expensive would be that of
intermediate technologies, then decreasing again in the
third stage – high technology. Weisbrod uses the evolu-
tion of poliomyelitis as an example: in the beginning (two
generations ago), its victims died rapidly as a result of
paralysis; then the development of intermediate technol-
ogy came about with the emergence of the iron lung,
which prolonged the patient's life at high cost; finally, the
vaccines (Sabin and Salk) in the high technology phase
reduced dramatically the costs associated with polio [13].
Based on this scheme, Weisbrod suggests, for the case of
the United States, that "the development of halfway tech-
nologies was implicitly encouraged by the cost-reimburse-
ment insurance system that has dominated hospital and
medical care until recently, because there was little or no
incentive for medical care providers to avoid costly tech-
nologies that were even marginally effective". (p. 534).
That is, it is not the technology that accounts for increased
costs, but the scheme of incentives that guides its
evolution.
Further on, Weisbrod lists the technologies with a
demand for health insurance: "the demand for health
insurance tends to increase most rapidly when changes in
technology are of the expenditure-increasing, halfway
type" However, high technologies (vaccines) would tend
to diminish the demand for insurance."
In order to confirm his suppositions, he describes some
impacts of the emergence of HMOs being more concerned
about costs; they would have broadened their R&D prof-
itability by directing their actions to: drugs that could
avoid costly treatments; drugs that replace surgeries (e.g.
cimetidine, a substitute for ulcer surgery) [13]. Lichten-
berg studied the relation between new medicine and the
demand for hospitalization and found that hospital bed-
days declined rapidly "for those diagnoses with a larger
number of drugs prescribed and a greater change in distri-
bution of medicines". He estimated that an increment of
100 prescriptions is associated with a reduction of 16.3
days of hospitalization [33].
However, perhaps Weisbrod has added another problem
to Arrow's paper. As it is basically bought to pay for hos-
pital treatments, health insurance provides incentives for
R&D to search for ways to treat patients rather than pre-
vent diseases. And this is not "optimum" in social terms.
Weisbrod's analysis is interesting as it contributes to
assessing the demand for innovation in the health sector
and mainly to show how the sector's organization affects
technological progress. However, in the debate on health
care changes, only the side of the demand for technologi-
cal innovation has been focused upon; the conditions
governing the supply of innovation have been neglected
[26]. Undoubtedly, further developments in cancer pre-
vention are restrained in part by the state of science.
A good example of such a restraint is provided by biotech-
nology: "a revolution in health care", announced OCDE
[32]. The development of genetic therapies might mean
treating cancers, genetic diseases and others (such as rheu-
matoid arthritis). Some research efforts are in the phase of
clinical trials. However, the development of such thera-
pies is complex and difficult, and so far "clinical efficacy
has not been demonstrated in any of the genetic thera-
pies". Perhaps "the genetic therapy will take a long time
before reaching the patients" [32].
However, it is possible to conjecture that the biotechnol-
ogy revolution will make high technology-type innova-
tion available as soon as it is developed and employed in
health care systems, in accordance with Weisbrod's
scheme – efficacy derived from the understanding of the
processes of a number of diseases treated with (cost-
reducing) vaccine-type therapies.
Discussion: issues concerning the situation in 
Brazil
So far the discussion has centred on advanced countries. A
brief introduction to the situation in Brazil requires cau-
tion so that conspicuous differences may not be neglected.
The first major difference is the country's development
stage. According to the World Bank, Brazil is a high-
medium income country, with a GDP per capita of USD
3640 in 1995, and was placed 46th in the world ranking
[34]. In relation to the Human Development Index
(HDI), it was ranked 58th in 1993 and 62nd in 1995. The
technological gap and the social gap come together. If
expressed by the terms used all through this paper, such a
reality can be translated into precariousness of social wel-
fare systems in the country (with severe influence on its
health care structure) and the rudimentary and incipient
character of the national innovation system [35].
This standpoint contributes to determining the scenario
of health and morbidity in the country. Brazil has been
undergoing, according to the jargon used in the health
milieu, an epidemiological transition, which combines
features found in a low-income country, such as sanita-
tion shortages, malnutrition and infectious-parasitic dis-
eases, with features of high-income countries, such as aHuman Resources for Health 2005, 3:8 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/8
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growing incidence of degenerative diseases. Such differ-
ences pose complex tasks to be tackled by the whole
health apparatus in the country.
As for the labour peculiarity, the health care sector must
count on broad competences, ranging from the treatment
of simple verminous diseases to modern techniques of
emergency treatment. A neurosurgeon and a plastic sur-
geon are not luxuries – these two kinds of specialists are
needed in a country with a high incidence of labour acci-
dents such as Brazil (one need consider only the kind of
accidents found in construction and those accidents
requiring hand-repairing surgery, recovery of persons with
burns, etc.).
To an extent, the capacities the advanced countries have
been building through time – which have been substitut-
ing for each other since their introduction – must coexist
in the country. The result is a health care system more
complex and differentiated than those of countries at
either extreme (high-income countries: no verminous dis-
eases and better labour conditions; low-income countries:
lower incidence of degenerative diseases).
Another effect of Brazil's economic stage is the existing
budgetary restriction: basic necessities (education, sanita-
tion, health, infrastructure investment) compete with
each other in budgets with relatively scarce resources.
The World Bank proposal for governmental action is
based on an intervention divided into three basic levels,
corresponding to three different foundations [1]: allevia-
tion of poverty and access of the poor to health care serv-
ices; public health; extension of medical care to the
population through insurance as well as its regulation.
The World Bank proposal concentrated the discussion on
the latter (insurance and regulation). The Brazilian pecu-
liarity would be the relevance of an action based on a
combination of these three levels [1].
That the Brazilian constitutional text has adopted the pro-
posed organization of a single health care system (SUS)
that is universal and equitable, with an integral and
socially controlled approach, is equally a significant con-
ceptual advancement and a great operational complica-
tion, when the health care scenario in the country is
considered.
Boelen [36] proposes a comparative analysis of the social
accountability of health care services that are oriented by
four polar concepts: equity versus quality and relevance
versus cost-effectiveness. According to the author, it
would be relatively easy to design an equitable system by
following a formula containing only the basic health care
actions for the most vulnerable population groups. In the
same way, it would be theoretically simple to construct
systems following the quality criterion alone, uncon-
cerned with the coverage of the actions developed. In this
case, the concept of relevance of the health care actions
would oppose the analysis of their cost effectiveness.
When writing its constitution chapter on health, and
hence including the SUS proposal, Brazil posed a great
challenge to itself, i.e. to reach the four cardinal points
(equity, quality, relevance and cost-effectiveness) at the
same time. The very fact that the health chapter of the Bra-
zilian constitution is within the social security area, join-
ing health care actions with social security and social work
activities, accounts for the size of such a challenge.
The difficulty resides in correctly developing the matching
of such elements. As compared with more advanced coun-
tries (Table 1), it is worth assessing the need for and pos-
sibility of a general increase in health care expenditure
(public and private). Public expenditure, by strengthening
basic programmes, public health and investment in regu-
latory activities (the recent scandal of falsified drugs is
tragic proof of the price to be paid for weakness in such
areas) cannot be replaced.
Based on the ideas discussed throughout the present
paper – that the health care system is placed in the inter-
section of the welfare system and the innovation system –
the relevance of social and economic investment in
research should be considered. Investment should be
made in the country to enhance scientific and technolog-
ical capacity in biotechnology as well as to improve and
extend sewage systems. The range of activities to be
achieved by the construction of these two indispensable
systems is sizable.
From the viewpoint of technological innovation in health
care and that of the rest of the innovation system as well,
the technological gap of the country, in relation to the
international technological frontier, reveals some advan-
tages and requires some efforts [37]. The advantages are as
follows: investment in initial phases of development is
not necessary, as the country is in its absorption phase of
technologies generated in the technological frontier; it is
quite possible for the country to adopt a technology after
defining its development "path" (i.e. expenditure on tech-
nologies that could later be replaced by new develop-
ments can be avoided).
However, such advantages cannot be exploited without
making important domestic investments – constructing
"absorption capacity" is a must, since: the absorption and
necessary adaptation of such technologies are not passive
processes; they require knowledge, critical mass, financial
and entrepreneurial capacity; they presuppose a follow-upHuman Resources for Health 2005, 3:8 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/3/1/8
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and monitoring capacity of current scientific and techno-
logical progress, to the extent that basic research fre-
quently means an entrance ticket to a circuit of scientific
and technological information, as pointed out by Mowery
& Rosenberg [38]; previous knowledge is necessary even
for a simple purchase of equipment, machines and
processes.
Conclusions: recognizing the worth of sectoral 
labour and integrating it
The incapacity of the market to allocate resources in
health care production, the asymmetry of knowledge and
the relation of trust between the physician and the patient
are among the reasons why attempts at external regulation
and control of health care labour have failed or can be
bypassed.
The traditional compendiums of health administration
have already recognized that the three basic modes of
health care labour remuneration – fixed-salary payment
based on time spent in the procedure, fee for service and
the different modes of capitation – present advantages
together with remarkable failures as to its performance
controllability.
Those receiving fixed salaries tend to evade providing serv-
ices, unlike those paid for procedures accomplished, who
tend to overestimate service provision, while mechanisms
for capitation may be bypassed through selecting less vul-
nerable groups. Perhaps for these very reasons, these
mechanisms are rarely used separately, and there is a trend
towards combining them, as for example, incentives for
increased productivity combined with wages.
No matter how creative health service managers may be,
there will always be circumstances standing in their way,
aggravated by a disguised protection of some attitudes by
corporatism, professional complicity or a strictly organ-
ized hierarchical structure. There are differential require-
ments that are rarely unequivocally expressed beforehand.
A clear example of this is the strict control of the hours
worked by subordinates, on the one hand, and a relative
leniency with physicians as to the same requirement, on
the other hand. Another striking example of such a situa-
tion is the failure of management to attempt to limit the
number of examinations and hospitalizations provoked
by a given number of visits to the doctor.
First, standardization is impossible if the input of this sys-
tem is not known, i.e. the seriousness and complexity of
the pathologies to be treated. Furthermore, the control of
the denominator of this equation is very difficult, as it
consists of visits and not of assisted patients. As it would
hardly be reasonable to forbid the patient's return visits,
which would be desirable as a demonstration by the serv-
ice provider of concern with solving the problem, the
number of visits for a similar group could be unnecessar-
ily multiplied, which would allow a striking inflation of
procedures, in this way bypassing the external control.
For all these reasons, a tight wage policy and precarious
health care labour conditions, instead of saving resources,
may result in their waste by provoking an increment of
unnecessary examinations and hospitalizations that could
be avoided if a specific agreement to solve the problems
were reached. In this case, a positive labour incentive –
including improved wages and working conditions and
encouragement for training, i.e. positive organizational
"climate" and "culture" – would certainly represent a pos-
itive impact on health conditions without a burst of final
costs.
In the Brazilian experience it can be said that, on the neg-
ative side, doubling the salaries of social security physi-
cians after months of strike in the early 1990s did not have
measurable positive impacts on productivity and out-
come, despite the economic burden for the public
accounts. In contrast, some managerial micro-decisions
with low added costs – such as personal recognition, pres-
tige, kindness in interpersonal relations and a smooth
work environment, encouragement to participate in scien-
tific events, flexibility in order to attain personal expecta-
tions and demands – can have positive impacts in the
outcomes. Therefore, it seems clear that it would not be
possible to rationalize health care labour without the
workers' adherence and collaboration, in an agreement
that could simultaneously benefit users and providers.
Additionally, viewing the worth of labour exclusively as a
wage issue would be simplistic, although it is still crucial.
Another way to dignify labour is by implementing contin-
ued education and training of professional staff. This
process should take into account the rapid development
of the innovation system whose consequence is the obso-
lescence of acquired knowledge. More than half of medi-
cal techniques are estimated to become useless in 16 to 18
years. The contribution of the academic apparatus –
which was so relevant during the medical education
"boom" period about 20 years ago and surely made this
professional activity available to large population contin-
gents, previously unassisted – will be lessened if such
institutions continue giving only initial education back-
ground to physicians and other professionals in the sec-
tor, which was a very important mission when innovation
was a relatively slow-paced process.
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